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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT B. RUMSEY, 
Plain.tiff a;nd Respondent, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a l\1unicipal 
Corporation, of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and .._Jppellant. 
Case 
No.10181 
BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE ICIND OF CASE 
As stated in appellant's brief this is an action by 
plaintiff-respondent for personal injuries resulting from 
an accident on a diving board at the Wasatch Springs 
Plunge, operated by appellant, Salt Lake City. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The action was tried before a jury in the District 
Court and the issues were found in favor of plaintiff-
respondent and against defendant-appellant. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the judgment reversed and 
the action dismissed. Respondent asks that the jury 
verdict and the judgment of the lower court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees substantially with appellant's 
statement of facts, but adds the following: 
Plaintiff-respondent was injured as a result of a 
fall from a. diving board at Wasatch Springs Plunge. The 
"sticky surface" or safety walk on the end of the diving 
board had worn off, leaving the bare metal exposed. A 
lifeguard had reported this condition as being dangerous 
on February 25, 1963 (T. 7, 20) and again brought the 
matter to the attention of the manager on approximately 
March 25, 1963 ( T. 12). Nothing was done to repair the 
board until after the accident, ""hich occurred on June 
26, 1963 (T. 14). 
The evidence further showed that plaintiff was com-
pletely unaware of the dangerous condition of the diving 
board. He had not patronized the pool for approximately 
3 to 4 years prior to the date of the accident ( T. 71). He 
slipped on the board and the accident occurred 'vhile 
making his first dive on the day in question (T. 71). 
After the conclusion of the evidence the case was 
submitted to the jury with instructions on the issues of 
negligence, proximate cause, damages, contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk (R. 12-46). Appellant took 
2 
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no exception to the instructions of the court. The jury 
found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded general and 
special damages totaling $6,400.00. The injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff were substantial and there is no c1a.im 
that the damages are excessive. 
After the entry of the jury verdict defendant moved 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging 
among other things that plaintiff had failed to plead or 
prove that Salt Lake City operated W a.satch Springs 
Plunge in a proprietary capacity (R. 65). The issue of 
governmental immunity was not included or mentioned 
in the pre-trial order as an issue to be tried in the case 
(R. 8, 9) and the parties stipulated as a part of said pre-
trial order that plaintiff occupied the legal position of 
a. business invitee (R. 8). Also, the unopposed and un-
controverted affidavit of counsel sho,vs that the govern-
mental immunity question was actually discussed at the 
pre-trial conference and said defense was abandoned by 
defendant (R 70). 
In order to remove any possibility of prejudice 
against the defendant and in order to correct any pos-
sible error resulting from the failure of the pre-trial 
order to specifically recite the governmental immunity 
issue, plaintiff made a motion to the trial court to clarify 
or amend the judgment and grant a new trial on the issue 
of governmental immunity (R. 71). In response to this 
motion the trial court exercised its discretion to permit 
plaintiff to reopen the case and hear further testimony on 
this issue. After notice, the matter was heard on J nne 
15, 1964, at which time the short undisputed testimony 
3 
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of City Commissioner Joe Christensen and Pool Man-
ager James A. Nunley was to the effect that the city 
charged admissions for swimming, that the city attempts 
to derive revenue from the pool, that federal and state 
taxes are charged on admissions, that Wasatch Springs 
Plunge is operated differently from other city-owned 
swimming pools which are operated in connection with 
parks and playgrounds, and that the pool is operated in 
the same manner as it was during the time 'vhen prior 
Supreme Court decisions held the same operation to be 
proprietary. The court found from the evidence that the 
City of Salt Lake operated Wasatch Springs Plunge in a 
proprietary capacity and further granted plaintiff's ad-
ditiona~ motion to amend his pleadings to conform to 
the evidence (T. 114-116; R. 84-85). Defendant's mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 'vas de-
nied (R. 79-80). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRE-
TION IN PER~IITTING PLAINTIFF TO RE-
OPEN THE CASE TO PERMIT FURTHER 
TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT OF GOV-
ERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
Appellant has cla!med that the court cQmmitted 
prejudicial error in permitting plaintiff to reopen . his 
case after the jury 'vas discharged. Appeilant relies on 
rule 59 (a.), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which ·pro-
vides as follows: 
''Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties, 
4 
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and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes ; provided, however, that on mo.:. 
tion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one 
has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment:'' 
It is to be noted that the first clause of the above 
rule permitting a new trial on part of the issues is not 
restricted to non-jury cases, but applies to jury cases as 
well. The last clause relates solely to non-jury cases, 
there being llO statutory direction 1Vith respect to the re-
opening of a jury case. 
It can be reasonably argued from the language of 
the rule that the- intent "\\.,.as to prohibit the reopening of 
a jury case with respect to issues upon "\vhich the jury 
considered and determined. The reason for such a rule 
is obviously apparent. A litigant is entitled to have a 
jury pass upon all questions of fact and if the court 
"\vere to permit a litigant to reopen a case after the jury 
is discharged, such could have the effect of depriving 
the party of his right to trial by jury. 
The above argument, however, is completely unrea-
sonable and senseless when applied to the reopening of 
a case to determine matters not within the realm of the 
jury. With respect to such issues the distinction bet,veen 
a jury and non-jury case becomes meaningless. In thP 
case before the court the only purpose of the reopening· 
of the case was to hear additional testimony on the sul.,-
ject of governmental immunity. It has been uniformly 
5 
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held that the qustion of "\vhether a municipality is acting 
in a governmental capacity is a question of law, to be 
decided by the court and should not be submitted to the 
jury. Carr v. City and County of Sam Frarn.cisco, 170 
Cal. Appeals 2d 48, 338 P. 2d 509; Barrett v. City of 
Sa.n Jose, 161 Cal. App·eals 2d 40, 325 P. 2d 1026; Hansen. 
v. City of Los Angeles, 147 P. 2d 109. Thus, while it "\vould 
clearly have been error for the court to permit the re-
opening of a jury case to reconsider such questions as 
negligence or contributory negligence, it should not be 
improper in the exercise of sound judicial discretion to 
reopen a jury case to determine an issue solely within 
the province of the court and completely outside of the 
jurisdiction of the jury. 
In the case of M attfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 32 
N.W. 2d, 291 3 A.L.R. 2d 909, the Minnesota Court per-
mitted the plaintiff after the verdict and the discharge of 
the jury to reopen the case and prove that the plaintiff 
was the duly appointed administrator of the decedent in 
a wrongful death action, a necessary element which plain-
tiff, through oversight, had failed to prove. It was held 
that independent of statute, courts have inherent po,ver 
to correct or supply any omissions in the proceeding or 
record. The- court further stated as follows: 
''Where, as here, the omission relates to a fact 
provable by a document of an indisputable and in-
controve·rtible nature, the adverse party is denied 
no right by reop·ening and receiving such proof, 
because even upon the trial the court would have 
been bound to preemptorily instruct the jury that 
the document spoke for itself and that the jury 
6 
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had nothing to determine vvith respect to the facts 
to \vhich the document related. 
. . . Furthermore, the interests of justice re·-
quire that the proof be received and that the liti-
gation be ended. Courts, both trial and appellate, 
in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice re-
sulting from a retrial, for the purpose of proving 
a fact, the existence of which can be conclusively 
established by an indisputable and incontrover-
tible document, have the power to reopen the 
case to receive such proof even after verdict, and 
will exercise the power to sustain a verdict or 
judgment where the omission was caused through 
inadvertence or mistake of counsel for the pre-
vailing party in failing to offer the proof upon 
the trial. (Citation of Cases).'' 
The above reasoning clearly applies to the case be-
fore the court. The evidence offered at the rehearing was 
indisputable and incontrovertible and in accordance with 
two prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, holding 
conclusively that this exact operation of the city is of a 
proprietary nature. Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 
186, 253 P. 443; Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 
176 P. 2d 156. 
The Utah court has traditionally held that a mo-
tion for ne\v trial or a motion to reopen the case is a 
matter \Vithin the discretion of the trial court. Numer-
ous cases on this point can be summed up by the fol-
lowing statement from Wasatch Oril Refining Cotnpany v. 
Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070: 
''A motion to reopen a case for the purpose of in-
troducing further evidence is addressed to tlH• 
...., 
t 
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sound discretion of the court, which will be lib-
erally exercised in behalf of allo,ving the whole 
case to be presented, and the granting or refusing 
of such motion will not be interfered with in the 
absence of a. showing of abuse of discretion.'' 
There has been no sho,ving of abuse of discretion 
in the instant case. 
One of the matters which the court in all likelihood 
considered in exercising its discretion to reopen the case, 
was the affidavit of counsel stating that the question of 
governmental immunity was actually discussed at the 
pre-trial conference and was abandoned as a defense by 
defendant. Rule 59 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides that motions made under said rule after trial 
may be based upon affidavits and that the opposing party 
shal1 have ten additional days after the filing of affidavits 
in which to file opposing affidavits. Plaintiff's affidavit 
"\vas not opposed. Where matters are permitted to be 
determined upon the basis of affidavits an opposing party 
ought to be required to file an opposing affidaYit or at 
least make a showing 'vhy he cannot do so; other"ise the 
facts in the unopposed affidavit should be taken as true. 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624. In light 
of the facts as stated in the unopposed affidavit it "-ould 
seem that the court 'vas acting fair to both parties in 
permitting the case to be reopened for testimony on this 
issue. Defendant Salt Lake City could not possibly have 
been prejudiced by this procedure, it being g·iven full op-
portunity to defend on the issue of governmental Im-
munity if any defense \Yere available to it. 
8 
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Rule 76, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, also can 
be cited as additional authority supporting the view that 
it 'vas proper for the trial court to reopen the case. This 
rule permits the appellate court not only to affirm, re-
verse or modify any judgment or order, but also the ap-
pellate court may ''Direct . . . further proceedings to be 
had" in the trial court. Under such a. rule it is gener-
ally held that the appellate court may either grant a com-
plete ne'v trial or restrict or limit the issues to be tried 
in the lower court or to direct appropriate proceedings 
'vhere material issues in the case were not fully litigated 
below. · C. J. S. Appeal and Error, Sections 1935, 1942. 
The appellate court further can even order pleadings to 
be amended where the ends of justice so require. C. J. S. 
Appeal and Error, Section 1936. The policy of the la"'" 
is to avoid appeals and to permit the trial court to correct 
any errors or irregularities which do not prejudice the 
rights of the parties. It would thus be unreasonable to 
say that the trial court is powerless to do on its o'vn what 
the Supreme Court could direct it to do. 
POINT II. 
THE RECORD IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT AND JURY VER-
DICT EVEN WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OFFERED UPON 
THE REOPENING OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to 
pre-trial procedure provides that where a pre-trial con-
ference is held, the court shall make a pre-trial order and 
9 
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such order, when entered, controls the subsequent course 
of the action. 
It is uniformly held that where a pre-trial order or 
report purports to state the issues to be tried, the trial 
should be confined to such issues and other issues are 
eliminated from consideration. Annotation 22 A.L.R. 
2nd, 599, 603. It is also established that participants in 
a pre-trial conference are held to \Vaive issues not there 
presented. Annotation 22 A.L.R. 2nd 599, 603. A party 
who is advised in the pre-trial order of the issues to be 
tried is in no position to claim error as to issues litigated. 
Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 313, 313 P. 2d 465. 
The pre-trial order in the instant case purported to 
state the issues to be tried in the ca.se. Now here in said 
order is there any mention of a governmental immunity 
issue. To the contrary, the order specifically recited the 
stipulation of the parties ''that the plaintiff at the time of 
his claimed injuries was a business invitee.'' Stipula-
tions made by attorneys at pre-trial are binding upon the 
clients and upon the subsequent course of the trial. An-
notation 22 A. L. R. 2d 599, 602. 
It is unfortunate that the pre-trial order did not re-
cite in more detail the exclusion of the sovereign immu-
nity issue. However, the unopposed and uncontroverted 
affidavit of counsel shows that the rna tter \Vas discussed 
specifically and that defendant did not claim such a de-
fense and abandoned the same after a discussion be-
tween court and counsel of the Burton Y. Salt Lake C·ity 
and Griffin v. Salt Lake City cases, supra, both of said 
10 
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eases holding that the City of Salt Lake operated W a-
satch Springs Plunge in a proprietary capacity. 
Nor were the pleadings defective inasmuch as plain-
tilff moved pursuant to Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to amend said pleadings and specifically plead 
that the City of Salt Lake operates Wasatch Springs 
Plunge in a proprietary capacity, and said motion was 
granted by the court ( T. 207-209 ; R. 84, 85). The granting 
of such a motion by the trial court was proper where there 
is no showing that defendant had been misled, or prevent-
ed from presenting all of its evidence. Morris v. Russell, 
120 Utah 545, 236 P. 2d 451. The rules of Civil Procedure 
provide considerable latitude in pleading and proof, so 
long as the adverse party is protected from surprise and 
assured equal opportunity and facility to prove counter-
contentions. Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 
264 P. 2d 279. Defendant has had full opportunity in this 
case to meet all issues and raise all defenses, including 
the defense of governmental immunity had such defense 
been meritorious. 
POINT III. 
THE QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO TH]J 
JURY. 
If the defendant Salt Lake City was negligent in per-
mitting the safety walk material at the end of the diving 
board to become worn off, leaving slick exposed m_a-
terial at the end of the board, and if, plaintiff fell and 
'vas injured from slipping on the end of the diving board, 
11 
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it is difficult to see how such negligence could be anything 
other than the proximate eause of the injury. Such cause 
would be the proximate cause unless there 'vas some 
other intervening cause or unless the injury was not rea-
sonably foreseeable. KaltV'aguchi v. Benn.ett, 112 Utah 
442, 189 p. 2d 109. 
If the facts of any case are such that reasonable men 
might draw different conclusions, the question of proxi-
mate cause is for the jury. Shafer v. Keely Ice Cream. 
Company, 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300. Certainly here in the 
instant case a reasonable peTson might conclude the 
foreseeability and likelihood of injury from the negli-
gence of defendant in permitting a. slick exposed condi-
tion to remain a.t the end of its diving board. It would 
be more reasonable to argue that reasonable minds could 
not have reached any other eonclusion and that the court 
should have found proximate cause as a matter of la,Y. 
The question of proximate cause 'vas submitted to 
the jury under instructions which 'vere unobjected to by 
defendant and upon which no exceptions were taken. The 
instructions "\vere properly given and the issue of proxi-
mate cause was properly presented as a jury question and 
determined by the jury. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment 
and jury verdict of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEIL D. SCHAERRER 
1300 W a.lker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff a.nd 
Respondent 
13 
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